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I examine the transmission of expansionary U.S. monetary policy
in cases where emerging economies—including China—peg their curren-
cies to the dollar. I evaluate the value of the dollar peg as a fraction
of consumption that households would be willing to pay for the dollar
peg to remain as well off under the dollar peg as they would be un-
der a flexible exchange rate. The value of the dollar peg is typically
positive for the dollar bloc because the U.S. can no longer improve its
terms of trade at the dollar bloc’s expense. This provides a rationale
for fixing the exchange rate. The dollar peg is typically harmful to
the U.S., providing a rationale for criticism of China’s exchange rate
policy during the Great Recession.
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The international transmission of U.S. monetary policy and China’s exchange
rate policy were topics of debate during the Great Recession. The U.S. Fed-
eral Reserve (Fed) was accused of competitive devaluation, which deliberately
attempts to depreciate the dollar and stimulate the U.S. economy and—in
particular—its exports at the expense of the rest of the world. Stiglitz (2008
& 2010), for instance, argued that U.S. interest rate reductions are a beggar-
thy-neighbor policy as they have depreciated the dollar and helped to export
the weakness of the U.S. economy to other countries.
Rajan (2011) argued that expansionary U.S. monetary policy represents
a threat to the rest of the world. The argument goes as follows: U.S. interest
rate reductions are followed by identical cuts everywhere, because no country
wants its currency to appreciate strongly against the dollar. Consequently,
the Fed ends up setting monetary policy also for the rest of the world. An
expansionary U.S. monetary policy that is appropriate for the U.S. economy
may be overly aggressive for emerging economies, where it leads to asset
bubbles and inflation.
The Economist (2011) emphasized that 66 countries have either adopted
the dollar as legal tender, pegged their currency to it or managed their ex-
change rate against it during the Great Recession. The dollar bloc’s collec-
tive GDP was almost 9 trillion dollars, or about 14% of the world economy.
The dollar bloc contains oil producers and emerging economies. Erceg et al.
(2011) mention that various motivations for the dollar peg have been offered,
including the desire to keep currencies weak and exports competitive and to
avoid the adverse effects of exchange rate fluctuations on the balance sheets
of domestic firms and households. The dollar peg also serves as a strong and
easily understood anchor for monetary policy (Abed et al. 2003).
The largest member of the dollar bloc—by far—is China. It has been
accused of currency manipulation to keep the yuan weak and its exports
competitive during the global recession, when the Fed cut interest rates ag-
gressively. Krugman (2010) argued that this was "the most distortionary ex-
change rate policy any major nation has ever followed", and the U.S. Treasury
should have labelled China a currency manipulator. Importantly, political
pressure to do so rose during the financial crisis (The Economist 2010).
In this paper, I use a New Keynesian open-economy model to examine
the consequences of emerging economies’—including China’s—dollar peg for
the international transmission of a U.S. monetary policy shock (the deviation
from the Taylor rule). I assume that the dollar bloc pegs the exchange rate
to the dollar by following U.S. monetary policy. In addition, I assume that
all export prices are set in U.S. dollars, which I refer to as dollar pricing.
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The assumption of dollar pricing is consistent with the empirical evidence of
Goldberg and Tille (2008), who find that 99.8% of U.S. exports and 92.8%
of U.S. imports are invoiced in dollars.
The implications of the dollar bloc’s currency manipulation has been de-
bated. This paper contributes to the debate by developing a novel way to
measure the value of the dollar peg for the dollar bloc and the U.S. I mea-
sure the value of the dollar peg as a fraction of consumption that households
would be willing to pay for the dollar peg to remain to be as well off under
the dollar peg as under a flexible exchange rate.
The theme is related to the classic question of whether pegging the ex-
change rate is optimal. Since the publication of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002),
a strand of the recent literature has analyzed the optimal choice of the ex-
change rate regime in the face of monetary and real shocks based on rigorous
welfare analysis. Lahiri et al. (2008) say that the classical finding in the
world of sticky prices and perfect capital mobility is that a flexible (fixed)
exchange rate is optimal if shocks are mainly real (monetary). This literature
addresses the question of whether fixing the exchange rate during domestic
shocks is optimal. However, the literature has not addressed the question of
whether it is optimal for foreign countries to fix their exchange rates during
domestic monetary shocks.
One of the main findings of this paper is that the value of the dollar
peg is positive for the dollar bloc (including China), unless the cross-country
substitutability (the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods) is very low, when U.S. interest rates fall. This provides a rationale
for fixing the exchange rate to the dollar during a period of expansionary
U.S. monetary policy. The positive value of the dollar peg stems from the
ability of the U.S. to improve its terms of trade and consumption at the dollar
bloc’s expense under flexible exchange rates. The dollar peg prevents this,
thereby increasing welfare. As Rajan (2011) suggested, the combination of
the dollar peg and aggressive U.S. monetary policy can lead to an overheating
of the dollar bloc. In the model, however, the dollar peg is optimal for the
dollar bloc because it prevents a negative spillover effect of U.S. monetary
expansion. A limitation of this paper is that the other types of shocks are
not modelled. Therefore, so one should bear in mind that the optimal choice
of exchange rate regime should depend not only on foreign monetary policy
shocks but also on the other types of shocks.
McKinnon and Schnabl (2012) and Schnabl (2010) analyze the costs and
benefits of the dollar peg for China, East Asia and the rest of the World
and argue that it plays an important role in the pursuit of macroeconomic
stability also in the case of U.S. monetary expansion. This paper supports
the view that the benefits may exceed the costs, not because of macroeco-
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nomic stability, but despite the macroeconomic instability (higher output
fluctuations) caused by the dollar peg.
Another of the main results of this paper is that the value of the dollar
peg is negative for the U.S., unless the cross-country substitutability is very
low. In the normal case, U.S. monetary policy is a beggar-thy-neighbor policy
since the U.S. can raise welfare by improving its terms of trade. The dollar
peg prevents this, so its value for the U.S. is negative.
If the cross-country substitutability is suffi ciently low, the value of the
dollar peg is positive for the U.S. Expansionary U.S. monetary policy under
the flexible exchange rate causes a deterioration in the U.S. terms of trade
in cases of very low cross-country substitutability. The dollar peg eliminates
this and therefore the value of the dollar peg for the U.S. becomes posi-
tive when the cross-country substitutability is suffi ciently low. However, the
results show that for the typical parameter values of the cross-country substi-
tutability, the value of the dollar peg is negative for the U.S. This provides a
novel rationale for criticism of China’s exchange rate policy during the Great
Recession. It is, however, worth observing that expansionary U.S. monetary
policy also increases U.S. welfare in the cases where the dollar bloc pegs the
exchange rate to the dollar. The dollar peg just reduces the welfare gain of
expansionary U.S. monetary policy to U.S. households.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model, Section 3 discusses the parameterization of the model, Section 4 analy-
ses the international transmission of U.S. monetary policy and the value of
the dollar peg, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
In this section, I develop a New Keynesian open-economy model in which
the world economy consists of two countries: the U.S. and the dollar bloc.
The dollar bloc refers to economies that have pegged their currencies to the
U.S. dollar. A continuum of firms and households are indexed by z ∈ [0, 1].
Fraction n of them are located in the U.S., while fraction 1 − n are located
in the dollar bloc.
Each firm produces a differentiated good, and nominal price rigidity is
introduced via the mechanism proposed by Calvo (1983). Empirical evidence
points to there being asymmetry in international price setting. Goldberg and
Tille (2008) find that 99.8% (92.8%) of U.S. exports (imports) are invoiced in
dollars. I assume that U.S. firms set a unified price across countries and set
their export prices in dollars. Firms in the dollar bloc can "price-to-market"
and set their export prices in dollars. The assumption of asymmetric export
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pricing implies that the exchange rate pass-through is zero in the U.S. and
one in the dollar bloc for those goods whose prices cannot be adjusted. In the
presentation that follows, if the equations are symmetric across countries, I
present only the U.S. equation.
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Preferences
All households have identical preferences. The utility function of the repre-









where E denotes the expectation operator, β is the discount factor, Ct is a
consumption index, `t is the labor supply, and ϕ is the Frisch elasticity of















where CUSt and C
DB
t respectively denote U.S. household consumption of U.S.
and the dollar bloc’s goods, ρ > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution be-
tween U.S. and the dollar bloc’s goods and κ denotes the share of U.S. goods
in the consumption basket.1 I refer to ρ as the cross-country substitutabil-
ity.2 The share of domestic goods in the U.S. consumption basket, κ ≡ nα
(0 < κ < 1), depends on the relative size of the U.S. economy (n) and
parameter α (α > 1), which captures the degree of home bias in consump-
tion. Consumption of domestic CUSt (z) and foreign C
DB
t (z) goods are CES
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where κ∗ ≡ nα∗ denotes the share of U.S. goods in the dollar bloc’s consumption basket.
Home bias requires α∗ < 1.






where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the
same country.
The consumption indexes imply that households allocate their consump-











































In these equations, asterisks indicate the dollar bloc’s variables. Therefore,
C∗USt (z) and C
∗DB
t (z) respectively denote consumption of the differentiated
U.S. and the dollar bloc’s goods by the dollar bloc’s households. All price
indexes are expressed in the local currency, although U.S. firms set their ex-
port prices in dollars. Price p represents dollar prices, and price p∗ represents
foreign currency prices. The dollar price of U.S. and the dollar bloc’s goods
are denoted by pUSt (z) and p
DB
t (z), respectively. p
∗US
t (z) and p
∗DB
t (z) are,
respectively, the foreign currency price of U.S. and the dollar bloc’s goods.
PUSt (P
DB
t ) is the price indexes corresponding to U.S. (the dollar bloc’s)
consumption basket CUSt (C
DB
t ), and Pt is the U.S. price index.






















1−ρ + (1− κ)(PDBt )1−ρ
] 1
1−ρ . (3)
The corresponding indexes for the dollar bloc are defined similarly.
2.1.2 Budget constraints and financial markets
Consider a cashless economy in which money is only a unit of account. The
budget constraint of the U.S. household, in nominal terms, is given by
Dt = (1 + it−1)Dt−1 + wt`t − PtCt + πt. (4)
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Dt denotes nominal bonds (that pay one dollar in period t + 1) held at the
end of period t, it−1 is the nominal interest rate on bonds between t− 1 and
t, w is the nominal wage paid to a household, and π denotes the household’s
share of the nominal profits (dividends) of U.S. firms. All U.S. (dollar bloc)
households own an equal share of all U.S. (dollar bloc) firms.
The structure of the dollar bloc is identical to that of the U.S. economy,
with one exception: U.S. households can hold only U.S. bonds, whereas
households in the dollar bloc can hold both U.S. and dollar bloc bonds.
Therefore, the foreign bond (F ∗), denominated in the currency of the dollar
bloc, is not traded internationally.
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t − P ∗t C∗t + π∗t , (5)
where St is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the dollar price of the dollar
bloc’s currency (an increase in St is a depreciation of the dollar). The global
asset market-clearing condition for U.S. bonds requires nDt+ (1−n)D∗t = 0.
The net supply of foreign bonds, on the other hand, is zero, because the
dollar bloc has only one representative household.
Use of the Taylor rule implies that the model must be stationary. One way
to render the model stationary is to assume that the domestic interest rate is
increasing on the level of net foreign debt (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2003).
I include a risk premium for uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) that forces
external debt in the long term to return to its initial level. Following Bergin
(2006), I assume that lenders demand a higher rate of return on a country
with a large external debt. The empirical evidence supports the view: highly
indebted countries have higher real interest rates than countries with more
positive external positions (Lane 2011). In addition, Bluedorn and Bowdler
(2011) show that U.S. interest rate shocks cause deviations from UIP.
Households in the dollar bloc must be indifferent to holding U.S. or the
dollar bloc bonds. The UIP with a risk premium (ψ(exp(Dt) − 1)) is given
by





+ ψ(exp(Dt)− 1). (6)
Equation (6) shows that households must pay a small cost if its bond holdings
do not equal their initial steady-state level (i.e., zero).

































Equations (7) and (8) are the Euler equations for optimal domestic and
foreign consumption, respectively. Equations (9) and (10) show that the
labor supply is an increasing function of real wages and a decreasing function
of consumption.
2.2 Monetary policy











where coeffi cients µ1, µ2 and µ3 are non-negative, y
gap
t is the output gap,
and εt is an unpredictable shift in the monetary policy rule (zero mean white
noise process). The output gap is defined as the deviation of output from
the equilibrium level that would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities.
Monetary policy does not have an effect on output in the absence of nominal
rigidities and therefore the deviation of output from the initial level actually
measures the output gap.
To evaluate the consequences of the dollar peg, I contrast the flexible
exchange rate case in which the central bank of the dollar bloc follows the
Taylor rule, which is identical to (11), with an alternative in which the central
bank pegs the exchange rate. Erceg et al. (2011) use this same approach.
For simplicity, I assume that the dollar peg is perfectly credible and the
central bank of the dollar bloc pegs the exchange rate by mimicking U.S.
monetary policy (it = i∗t ). The IMF (2013) has analyzed how a foreign
monetary policy reaction to U.S. monetary policy depends on the exchange
rate regime. The study cannot reject the possibility that the interest rate of
dollar bloc countries reacts one to one to movements in U.S. monetary policy.
A typical view is that most dollar bloc countries are to some extent
forced to follow U.S. monetary policy. Rogoff (2008) pointed out that during
the U.S. financial crisis, "[d]ollar bloc countries have slavishly mimicked ex-
pansionary US monetary policy". However, the question of whether China
has been able to implement an independent monetary policy is complicated.
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Koivu (2009) points out that China’s monetary policy has relied on a fixed
exchange rate, capital controls and a selection of administrative and quanti-
tative policy tools. Ma and McCauley (2008) find that capital controls have
proved effective. Cheung et al. (2008) find that U.S. interest rates have
a weak effect on China. They argue that even with the dollar peg, China
employs measures to retain its monetary policy independence.
Koivu (2009) points out that many features of China’s monetary policy
have changed in recent years. First, the role of interest rates has increased. In
2006—2007, the central bank increased the use of interest rates in an attempt
to keep rising inflation under control. Second, since the summer of 2003,
growing capital inflows have increased liquidity in China’s financial markets
and have complicated the conduct of monetary policy (Koivu 2009). Glick
and Hutchison (2009) and Prasad (2008) find that the fixed exchange rate
constrains China’s monetary policy independence. Zhang (2009) shows that
money supply has been a dominant policy instrument in China in the past
decades, but the Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing that responses to
the output gap and contemporary and expected inflation illustrates China’s
more recent monetary policy better.
Frankel (2010) finds that in 2007-2008, sterilization finally faltered and
money growth became excessive. Bordo et al. (2012) find that China’s
sterilized foreign-exchange intervention failed to provide the central bank
with a mechanism for systematically altering the exchange rate independently
of its monetary policy. Moreover, Wolf (2008) argues that "Ben Bernanke is
running the monetary policy of the People’s Bank of China." Although the
assumption that China follows U.S. monetary policy may be a bad reflection




All firms produce a differentiated good. The production function of the
representative U.S. firm is
yt (z) = `t, (12)
where yt (z) is the total output of firm z, and `t is the labor input.
The profits of the U.S. firm are given by




t (z)− wt`t. (13)
The firm takes into account the production function (12) and the demand
9









































As mentioned in Section 2, firms in the dollar bloc can "price-to-market"
and set their prices in the currency of the buyer. The total output of the
representative firm in the dollar bloc, y∗t (z), is divided between the output
sold in the U.S., v∗t (z), and the output sold in the dollar bloc, x
∗
t (z). Its
profits are given by








t (z)− w∗t `∗t (z) . (15)























(1− κ∗)C∗t . (17)
Equations (16) and (17) show demand in the U.S. and in the dollar bloc,
respectively.
2.3.2 Price setting
U.S. firms maximize their profits, specified in Equation (14), with respect to
pUSt (z). In the absence of price rigidities, this would imply
pUSt (z) =
θ
θ − 1wt. (18)
Under the Calvo pricing assumption, each firm may reset its price in any
given period with a probability of 1−γ, independently of other firms and the
elapsed time since the last adjustment. When setting a new price in period












where Qt,s is a stochastic discount factor between periods t and s. The U.S.







































The log-linear version of Equation (19) can be written as
p̂USt (z) = βγEtp̂
US
t+1(z) + (1− βγ)ŵt,
where percentage changes from the initial steady state (denoted by the sub-
script zero) are denoted by hats (e.g., wt = dwt/w0).The optimal price is the
weighted average of current and future nominal marginal costs.

























































The log-linear versions of these equations can be expressed as
p̂DBt (z) = βγEtp̂
DB
t+1(z) + (1− βγ)(ŵ∗t + St). (22)
p̂∗DBt (z) = βγEtp̂
∗DB
t+1 (z) + (1− βγ)ŵ∗t . (23)
Equation (22) shows that the optimal price of the dollar bloc’s good sold
in the U.S. is the weighted average of current and future nominal marginal
costs and the exchange rate.
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2.4 Symmetric equilibrium
Consider a symmetric case in which every firm that changes its price in any
given period chooses the same price and output. This implies that in each
period, a fraction of firms (1 − γ) sets a new price, and the price of the
remaining fraction remains unchanged.
The consolidated budget constraint of the home economy is derived with
Equations (4) and (13):
PtCt = p
US
t (z) yt (z) + (1 + it−1)Dt−1 −Dt. (24)
The corresponding foreign equation, which takes into account the global asset
market-clearing condition for U.S. bonds and that the net supply of the bond






















I use a log-linearized version of the model around a symmetric steady state
in which initial net foreign assets are zero (D0 = 0). In this case, taking also
into account that all prices are the same in the initial equilibrium, equation
(24) implies that C0 = y0(z). This and equations (9), (12) and (18) imply
that the initial level of employment is given by







Equilibrium is defined as sequences of variables that clear the labor and
goods markets in both countries every period and satisfy pricing rules and
intertemporal budget constraints.
3 Parameter values
The parameterization of the model, shown in Table 1, is chosen to match
features of the U.S. and the dollar bloc during the Great Recession. Periods
are interpreted as quarters. The discount factor β is set to 0.99. As mentioned
in Section 2, the Economist (2011) found that the dollar bloc’s collective
GDP was almost 9 trillion dollars at that time. U.S. GDP was roughly
14 trillion dollars at that time. Consequently, the relative size of the U.S.
economy (n) is set to 0.6. In comparison, Erceg et al. (2011) set the size
of the U.S. economy relative to the dollar bloc to 0.55, but argue that their
parameterization overstates the size of the dollar bloc.
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Table 1: Baseline parameterization
Param. Description Value Reference
β Discount factor 0.99
n Relative size of the U.S. 0.6 Economist (2011), World Bank (2016)
α Home bias parameter 1.4 World Bank (2016)
α∗ Home bias parameter 0.4 World Bank (2016)
µ1 Interest rate smoothing 0.8 Clarida et al. (2000)
µ2 Inflation coeffi cient 1.5 Taylor (1993)
µ3 Output gap coeffi cient 0.5/4 Taylor (1993)
ψ Risk premium parameter 0.004 Bergin (2006)
θ Within-country subst. 6 Rotemberg and Woodford (1992)
ϕ Frisch elasticity 1 Keane and Rogerson (2012)
γ Price rigidity 0.75 Gopinath and Rigobon (2008)
ρ Cross-country subst. 2 Hooper et al. (2000), Feenstra et al. (2017)
The home bias parameter α is set to match the empirically observed
import-to-output ratio in the U.S. The ratio averaged 16% in the U.S. in
2008—2012 (World Bank 2016). Therefore, α is set 0.84/0.6, so the import-
to-output ratio (1 − nα) is 16%. I assume that the per-capita levels of
output and consumption are identical across regions. This requires that
α∗ = (1−αn)/(1−n) = 0.4. The implied import-to-output ratio (κ∗ = α∗n)
in the dollar bloc is 24%, whereas the empirically observed ratio averaged
25% in China in 2008—2012 (World Bank 2016).
The interest rate smoothing parameter (µ1) is set to 0.8, which is consis-
tent with Clarida et al. (2000). Based on Taylor (1993), µ2 is set to 1.5 and
µ3 is set to 0.5/4. Zhang (2009) finds that before China returned to the tight
dollar peg in mid-2008 the interest rate smoothing parameter was 0.76 and
the weight of inflation (the annual output gap) was 0.94 (0.47). Therefore,
the Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing is not an unrealistic description
of monetary policy in China.
Based on Bergin (2006), the risk premium in UIP (ψ) is set to 0.004.
This implies that a net foreign debt of 10% of output increases the domestic
interest rate by four basis points relative to that of the foreign country. Based
on Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), the within-country substitutability (θ)
is set to 6. The Frisch elasticity (ϕ) is set to 1, based on Keane and Rogerson
(2012). These values are widely used in the business cycle literature.
The price rigidity parameter (γ) governs the strength and duration of the
expenditure switching effect. Consequently, it is important to set the parame-
ter to match the empirical evidence on the price rigidities of internationally
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traded goods. Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) find that the trade-weighted
median price duration is 12.8 (10.6) months for U.S. exports (imports). I
therefore set γ to 0.75, which implies that there is an average delay between
price adjustments of four quarters.
The cross-country substitutability ρ is a key parameter for the theme of
this paper. Tille (2001) shows that it is a key parameter in determining the
international welfare effects of monetary policy. Feenstra et al. (2017) find
that the median estimates of the micro elasticity (substitution between dif-
ferent import suppliers) between U.S. and foreign countries is between 3.2
and 4.1, whereas the macro elasticity (substitution between home produc-
tion and imports) is significantly lower in up to one-half of the goods they
analyzed. They argue, however, that the macro elasticity is not as low as
one sometimes found using macro methods.
Hooper et al. (2000) estimate the short- and long-term price elasticities
of exports and imports for G7 countries. They find that the sum of the
short-term elasticities for imports and exports exceeds one in absolute value
only in the U.S. For the U.S. it is 1.1; for Japan, it is 0.6. The elasticities,
however, increase over time and typically exceed one in the long term. The
sum of the long-term elasticities for the U.S. is 1.8; for Japan, it is 1.3.
I set ρ to 2, which is the near the middle of the estimates for the U.S.
provided by Feenstra et al. (2017) and Hooper et al. (2000). However, I
analyze the sensitivity of key results as I vary it from 0.5 to 6.3
4 International transmission of U.S. mone-
tary policy
4.1 U.S. monetary policy under flexible exchange rates
The main innovation of this paper is to evaluate the value of the dollar peg
relative to the flexible exchange rate. Therefore, I begin by analyzing the
international effects of a U.S. interest rate cut under flexible exchange rates.
Many of these results are not relevant per se; they provide a useful benchmark
to put into context the results of the following section.
I analyze the effects of a decrease of 100 basis points (bp) in the annual
U.S. interest rate. The empirical studies typically analyze the effects of 100
basis point changes in the interest rate and therefore the assumption makes it
easy to compare my results with the empirical findings. The 100 basis point
3I solved the model using the algorithm developed by Klein (2000) and McCallum
(2001).
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reduction in the interest rate might not seem to be a realistic description
of the response of the Fed to the crisis: the interest rate was driven all
the way to zero and the Fed has indicated that it will pursue the zero rate
interest policy for a long time. A shock to the monetary policy rule may
not be an optimal description of reality during the Great Recession, but it
is a simple way to model the loose monetary policy of the Fed. Figure 1 (on
page 36) shows the actual Fed funds rate and the interest rate implied by
the Taylor rule, using the same parameters as in the simulations.4 It shows
that the monetary policy response of the Fed to the Great Depression can be
understood mostly as a response to negative demand shocks rather than as
a deviation from the Taylor rule. However, it shows also that the Fed caused
a monetary policy shock in 2008, defined as the deviation from the Taylor
rule, of which size was 184 basis point in mid-2008. In 2009, the interest rate
was roughly in line with the Taylor rule.
The dynamic effects of this exercise appear in panels (a)-(h) of Figure 2
(on page 37). In all figures, the horizontal axis denotes time. The vertical
axis typically shows percentage deviations from the initial steady state.5 The
responses of inflation and interest rates, however, are expressed as percentage
point deviations in annual terms. The U.S. terms of trade, shown in Figure
2(d), are defined as the Calvo-weighted relative price of U.S. exports in terms
of U.S. imports. If the index rises, the U.S. terms of trade improve.
Figure 2(f) shows the response of the dollar bloc’s interest rate is in
practise zero. Caceres et al. (2016) find that the response of the foreign
interest rate to a 100 basis point change in the U.S. federal funds rate under
a fully flexible regime is indistinguishable from zero.
Figure 2(c) demonstrates that a U.S. interest rate reduction depreciates
the nominal exchange rate. The U.S. interest rate is temporarily low relative
to the dollar bloc’s interest rate. Since UIP holds, the exchange rate must
depreciate to a point where it will appreciate until it reaches the steady-state
level. Bluedorn and Bowdler (2011) find that a 100 basis point change in the
U.S. t-bill rate causes a contemporaneous movement of the dollar which ex-
ceeds one percentage point, for example, the change versus the British pound
is 1.3%. The results of this paper regarding the exchange rare movement are
in line with these findings.
In the dollar pricing case, the exchange rate pass-through to import price
is one in the dollar bloc and zero in the U.S. for those goods whose prices
cannot be adjusted. In the dollar bloc, the dollar’s depreciation implies
4The Taylor rule is now it = µ1it−1 + (1 − µ1)[(r∗ + 2) + µ2(πt − 2) + µ1y
gap
t ], where
r∗ is the equilibrium real interest rate (set to 2%) and πt is 4-quarter core inflation.
5The change in bond holding, whose initial steady state is zero, is expressed as a
deviation form initial consumption.
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that U.S. goods become cheaper relative to the dollar bloc’s goods. This
shifts demand toward U.S. goods and away from the dollar bloc’s goods.
This expenditure switching effect increases U.S. output and tends to decrease
the dollar bloc’s output. Due to a low cross-country substitutability, this
effect is relatively weak and dominated by the direct demand increase of
U.S. households. The exchange rate pass-through is zero in the U.S., and
a rise in U.S. demand increases both the U.S. and dollar bloc’s outputs.
Output, therefore, also increases in the dollar bloc in the short term.
A low real interest rate raises consumption in both regions. In the dol-
lar pricing case, the dollar’s depreciation reduces the dollar bloc’s earnings in
their own currencies (see Equation (15)). This and the expenditure switching
effect increase relative U.S. consumption. U.S. households smooth consump-
tion over time and save part of this income by running a current account
surplus in the short term (Figure 2(g)). The risk premium in UIP compels
bond holdings of the U.S. households to return to the initial level in the long
term. They therefore use accumulated wealth to finance consumption and
bond holdings begin to wane.
The next step is to implement welfare analysis. Following Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2007), it has become common to evaluate the welfare cost of policy
A relative to policy B, expressing the welfare difference in the percentage of
consumption that households are willing to give to be as well offunder policy
A as under policy B. Later in this paper, I evaluate the value of the dollar peg
as the percentage of consumption that households would be willing to pay
for the dollar peg in order to be as well off under the dollar peg as under a
floating exchange rate. To measure welfare in an identical way under flexible
exchange rates, I now measure the welfare benefit of monetary policy as the
percentage of consumption that households would be willing to pay for U.S.
monetary expansion to remain as well off in the monetary expansion case as
in the initial steady state.
As shown in Tervala (2012), the discounted present value (DPV) of the
welfare benefit of monetary policy relative to the initial steady state (in case
where a first-order approximation of the utility function is used), denoted by
λDPV , is given by:
λDPV = 100× [exp((1− β)(
∞∑
s=t
βs−t(Ĉs − `1+1/ϕ0 ˆ̀s))− 1]. (26)
Equation (26) measures the percentage of initial consumption that a house-
hold is willing to pay for monetary policy expansion.
Table 2: Welfare effects under flexible exchange rates
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ρ = 0.5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 3 ρ = 4 ρ = 5 ρ = 6
λDPV 0.023 0.36 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.46
λ∗DPV 0.47 -0.031 -0.12 -0.15 -0.17 -0.18 -0.19
Table 2 shows the welfare effects in the benchmark case (ρ = 2) and
when using a set of alternative parameter values for the cross-country substi-
tutability. It demonstrates that in the benchmark case, a U.S. interest rate
reduction is a beggar-thy-neighbor policy that increases U.S. welfare at the
dollar bloc’s expense. The welfare benefit for U.S. households is 0.42% for
their initial consumption.
Equation (26) shows that welfare is an increasing function of consumption
and a decreasing function of employment. A U.S. terms of trade improve-
ment explains the beggar-thy-neighbor welfare result. Monetary expansion
increases in U.S. consumption with no equivalent increase in employment.
As Figure 2(d) shows, the U.S. terms of trade improve even though prices
for both U.S. exports and imports are set in dollars. In the short term, some
firms can set a new price, and the relative increase in the demand curve for
U.S. firms allows them to raise the relative price of their goods. Thus, U.S.
terms of trade improve. This effect induces an increase in U.S. welfare. The
drop in the dollar bloc’s welfare stems from a deterioration of its terms of
trade.
Table 2 shows that an increase in U.S. welfare is a robust finding. A
very low cross-country substitutability (ρ = 0.5) implies an increase in the
dollar bloc’s welfare, however. Tille (2001) shows the cross-country substi-
tutability determines whether the consumption switching toward U.S. goods
is large enough to increase U.S. sales revenues, relative to the dollar bloc’s
revenues. In case of ρ = 0.5 domestic and foreign goods are complements
and the Marshall-Lerner condition is violated (see Tille 2001). In this case,
a change in the international price ratio reduces the U.S. sales revenues and
U.S. monetary expansion induces a U.S. current account deficit. The wealth
effect of debt increases the relative U.S. labor supply (output) in the medium
term and causes a U.S. terms of trade deterioration. This improves the dollar
bloc’s welfare. In the U.S., however, the benefits of higher output more than
offset the welfare loss of the terms of trade deterioration, so the U.S. welfare
effect remains positive.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) find that a domestic monetary expansion ben-
efits both the home and foreign country in cases where the cross-country sub-
stitutability is equal to the within-country substitutability and export prices
are set in the producer’s currency. Betts and Devereux (2000) demonstrate
that when export prices are set in the local currency of the consumer, a mon-
etary expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbor policy due to an improvement in
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the terms of trade. The results of this section show that under dollar pric-
ing a monetary expansion decreases foreign welfare unless the cross-country
substitutability is very low. The finding that the effects of monetary policy
under dollar pricing on foreign welfare depend qualitatively on the cross-
country substitutability does not appear in the literature. Schmidt (2006)
finds, setting the cross-country substitutability to 1.5, that a money supply
shock is a beggar-thy-neighbor policy under dollar pricing. Table 2, however,
shows that this result is not generally applicable.
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) show that the effect of domestic monetary
shocks on foreign welfare depends on the size of the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution relative to the cross-country substitutability when export
prices are set in the producer’s currency. I assume a logarithmic utility for
consumption, which implies that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is one (this is a standard assumption and consistent with balanced growth).
Therefore, one can generalize that a U.S. monetary shock increases the dol-
lar bloc’s welfare only when the cross-country substitutability is smaller than
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
4.2 Value of the dollar peg
In this section, I analyze a case in which the dollar bloc pegs the currency
to the dollar. Figure 3 (on page 38) shows the effects of a U.S. interest rate
shock identical to one discussed in the previous section. The solid lines show
the effects under flexible exchange rates, and the dashed lines depict the
effects in the dollar peg case.
The dollar bloc must now mimic U.S. monetary policy. Figure 3 does not
show the U.S. interest rate, but panel (h) depicts an interest rate in the dollar
bloc that is identical to the U.S. rate. An interest rate cut in both regions
implies a larger monetary expansion. Consequently, world consumption and
output increase more under the dollar peg than they would under flexible
exchange rates.
The dollar peg eliminates movement in the nominal exchange rate (Figure
3(e)), thus eliminating the expenditure switching effect that increases rela-
tive U.S. output under flexible exchange rates. Consequently, U.S. output
increases by slightly less (Figure 3(a)) and the dollar bloc’s output increases
by more than they would under flexible exchange rates (Figure 3(b)). Erceg
et al. (2011) developed a three-country model (the U.S., the dollar bloc and
the rest of the world) and found that (their Figure 4) U.S. output is nearly in-
variant to assumptions about the dollar bloc’s monetary policy. This finding
is consistent with my finding.
The IMF (2013) has studied how the foreign output effect of U.S. mon-
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etary policy (an increase of 100 basis points in the policy rate) depends on
the exchange rate regime. It found that contractionary U.S. monetary policy
reduces foreign output substantially and significantly in countries with an
exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar but the output effect for countries
with a flexible exchange rate against the dollar is not significantly different
from zero. The results of this papers, shown in Figure 3(b), are in line with
the findings of the IMF (2013) in so far as the foreign output effect is sub-
stantial in the case of the dollar peg but close to zero in case of a flexible
exchange rate.6
The dollar peg eliminates a distribution of income toward the U.S. and
thus monetary expansion does not increase relative U.S. income and U.S.
households cannot accumulate external wealth (see Figure 3(g)) for future
consumption. This implies that the risk premium in UIP plays no role in
adjustment dynamics. An identical increase in outputs implies that the in-
ternational price ratio does not change. Consequently, Figure 3(f) shows, the
U.S. terms of trade remain constant. This result is important for welfare,
because the increase in U.S. welfare under the flexible exchange rate is based
on improved terms of trade.
Figure 3(b) demonstrates that, compared to the flexible exchange rate
case, the dollar bloc’s consumption increases. The dollar bloc’s monetary
expansion and the elimination of the expenditure switching effect imply a
greater increase in the dollar bloc’s output. In addition, the fact that the
dollar bloc’s terms of trade do not deteriorate increases the dollar bloc’s
consumption, in comparison to the flexible exchange rate case.
Welfare increases equally in both the U.S. and the dollar bloc. They
implement identical monetary expansion, consumption and employment in-
crease equally, and the change in welfare therefore is identical. In addition,
the size of the welfare gain (0.29% of initial consumption) does not depend
on the cross-country substitutability.
The main innovation of this paper is to evaluate the value of the dollar
peg, which I define as the percentage of consumption that households would
be willing to pay for the dollar peg in order to be as well off under the dollar
peg as under a floating exchange rate, assuming that labor supply remains
constant.
Let UFDPV be the DPV of welfare under floating exchange rates, and let
6This reasoning assumes that the effects of monetary policy are symmetric. Barnichon
and Matthes (2017) find a difference between the effects of contractionary and expansion-
ary monetary policy, consistent with the “pushing on a string”metaphor.
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Solving for λPEGDPV and expressing the value of the dollar peg as the percentage
of consumption (instead of a fraction of it) yields
λPEGDPV = 100× [exp(1− β)(UPEGDPV − UFDPV )− 1]. (28)
First-order approximations of the utility function are
dUPEGDPV = U
PEG


















where d denotes change and the superscript PEG and F serve to denote the
dollar peg and floating exchange rate. Making use of Equations (29) and
(30), Equation (28) can be written as follows:















s )))− 1]. (31)
Equation (31) measures the value of the dollar peg as the percentage of
consumption that the domestic household is willing to pay for the dollar peg
in order to be as well off under the dollar peg as under the floating exchange
rate. Consequently, a positive value for the dollar peg implies that households
are better off under the dollar peg.
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Table 3: Value of the dollar peg
ρ = 0.5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 3 ρ = 4 ρ = 5 ρ = 6
λPEGDPV 0.27 -0.067 -0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.16 -0.17
λ∗PEGDPV -0.18 0.32 0.41 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.48
Table 3 shows that the value of the dollar peg is negative for the U.S.,
unless the cross-country substitutability is very low (ρ = 0.5). U.S. house-
holds are willing to pay part of their consumption to eliminate the dollar peg.
The households in the dollar bloc are better off under the dollar peg, unless
the cross-country substitutability is very low. This provides a rationale for
the dollar bloc to peg the currency to the U.S. dollar. To the best of my
knowledge, these results are all new, since the existing literature contains
no analyses of the value of the dollar peg relative to cases where countries
adhere to the Taylor rule.
The positive value of the dollar peg for the dollar bloc stems from the
ability of the U.S. to improve its terms of trade at the dollar bloc’s expense
under flexible exchange rates. The dollar peg prevents this, and in essence
renders the dollar bloc a closed economy: its consumption and output in-
crease by equally. This increases welfare in the model. Due to imperfect
competition, the levels of consumption and output are ineffi ciently low, and
interest rate reductions bring them temporarily closer to an effi cient level,
thereby increasing welfare. The positive value of the dollar peg comes from
the fact that the dollar peg prevents the U.S. from deteriorating the dollar
bloc’s terms of trade and forces monetary expansion in the dollar bloc.
The value of the dollar peg, however, is negative for the dollar bloc in
cases where the cross-country substitutability is very low (ρ = 0.5). In this
case, under the flexible exchange rate, a change in the international price
ratio reduces (increases) the U.S. (the dollar bloc’s) sales revenues, because
the Marshall-Lerner condition is violated, and the wealth effect causes a U.S.
terms of trade deterioration, increasing welfare in the dollar bloc. The dollar
peg eliminates this and consequently the value of the dollar peg for the dollar
bloc becomes negative when the cross-country substitutability is suffi ciently
low.
As Table 3 shows, the value of the dollar peg is typically negative for the
U.S. When the dollar peg is used, U.S. interest rate reductions do not raise
U.S. consumption by improving U.S. terms of trade. The dollar peg pre-
vents the U.S. from improving its terms of trade at the dollar bloc’s expense.
Consequently, the dollar peg is harmful to the U.S. Interest rate reductions
increase U.S. welfare, but the value of the dollar peg is nonetheless negative.
The value of the dollar peg is positive for the U.S. if the cross-country
substitutability is very low (ρ = 0.5). As mentioned, U.S. interest rate
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reductions under the flexible exchange rate induce a U.S. terms of trade
deterioration in cases of a very low cross-country substitutability. The dollar
peg eliminates this and therefore increases welfare, compared with the flexible
exchange rate case. Consequently, the value of the dollar peg for the U.S.
becomes positive when the cross-country substitutability is suffi ciently low.
As mentioned, the spillover effects of monetary policy depend on the size
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which is one in this model,
relative to the cross-country substitutability. More generally, the value of
the dollar peg depends on the relative sizes of these parameters. Erceg at al.
(2010) argue that, while in the macro literature the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is typically set to one, microeconomic estimates suggest that it
is in the range of 0.2 to 0.7. As mentioned in Section 3, empirical estimates
for the cross-country substitutability vary, but they are almost always larger
than one. This suggest that for the realistic parameter combinations of the
cross-country substitutability and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
the value of the dollar peg is indeed negative for the U.S. and positive for
the dollar bloc.
Betts and Devereux (2000) find that a domestic monetary expansion is a
beggar-thy-neighbor policy in cases of local currency pricing. If the foreign
country also implements a monetary expansion, the exchange rate will be
unchanged and both countries will be better off. The findings of this pa-
per complement those of Betts and Devereux (2000). The analysis of this
paper shows that foreign countries, in a model with dollar pricing and a con-
sumption index in which the cross-country substitutability can differ from
the within-country substitutability, are not necessarily better off if they also
implement a monetary expansion. In addition, the value of the dollar peg
is typically negative for the U.S. That is, a monetary expansion also by a
foreign country is not beneficial to the home country.7
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
The next step analyzes the sensitivity of the main results to changes in po-
tential key features of the model. First, I change the behavior of the central
bank of the dollar bloc in the flexible exchange rate case, holding everything
else the same. Second, I change the behavior of the central bank of the dollar
7This model extends the framework of Betts and Devereux (2000) in several ways. The
first extension is the introduction of staggered price setting in the form of Calvo (instead
of the assumption that prices are set for one period). Tervala (2012), however, shows that
Calvo pricing does not change the main results of Betts and Devereux (2000). The second
extension is the introduction of home bias in consumption. This extension, however, does
not qualitatively change the result regarding the value of the dollar peg.
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bloc in the dollar peg case, holding everything else at the same values as in
the baseline. Third, I vary only the parameters of the model.
The benchmark economy for welfare comparisons is the one with the
flexible exchange rate case, under which both countries follow a Taylor rule
with interest rate smoothing. This may be too narrow and it is interesting
to use different monetary policy rules for the dollar bloc as a benchmark to
examine the welfare benefits of the dollar peg. I analyze the consequences
of three alternative monetary policy rule for the dollar bloc in the case of a
flexible exchange rate regime. The first rule is the Taylor without interest
rate smoothing (TRw/oS, for short), i.e. µ1 = 0 in equation (11). The
second is the inflation-based Taylor rule (ITR, for short) without interest
rate smoothing, i.e. µ1 = µ3 = 0. The third rule is the domestic inflation-





Table 4: Sensitivity analysis: the value of the dollar peg
Row Modification λPEGDPV λ
∗PEG
DPV
1 Baseline -0.13 0.41
2 TRw/oS -0.13 0.41
3 ITR -0.13 0.41
4 DITR -0.13 0.41
5 Soft dollar peg -0.089 0.29
6 γ = 0.5 -0.064 0.18
7 θ = 9 -0.13 0.34
8 ϕ = 0.5 -0.14 0.40
9 ϕ = 2 -0.12 0.43
10 n = 0.55 -0.13 0.40
Row 1-4 of Table 4 show the value of the dollar peg under the four dif-
ferent policy rules for the dollar peg in the case where the cross-country
substitutability is two. The table shows that it is a robust finding that the
dollar peg is harmful to the U.S. but beneficial for the dollar peg in the case of
expansionary U.S. monetary policy, unless the cross-country substitutability
is very low. Under these policy rules the dollar bloc’s monetary policy has
very limited impact on the value of the dollar peg. The main reason for this
is that under all these rules the response of the dollar bloc’s central bank is
very mild.
8Gali and Monacelli (2005) use the second and third rule to analyze monetary policy
for a small open economy.
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The IMF (2013, 108) finds, as mentioned in Section 2, that it "cannot
reject the possibility that the interest rate of a pegging country reacts one
to one to movements in the federal funds rate, as theory would predict for
a perfectly credible peg". In the previous analyses, I have assumed that
the dollar bloc pegs the exchange rate by mimicking U.S. monetary policy
(it = i∗t ). However, the IMF (2013) finds that a surprise change of 100 basis
points in the U.S. policy rate is typically followed by a change of about 70
basis points in countries that peg their currency to the U.S. dollar. Next I
check the sensitivity of the main results to a change in the behavior of the
central banks of the dollar bloc where there is a dollar peg. Based on the
finding of the IMF (2013), I assume that a decrease of 100 basis points in
the U.S. interest rate is followed by a decrease of 70 basis points in the dollar
bloc’s interest rates. This can be done by assuming that the central banks of
the dollar bloc follow the baseline Taylor rule, equation (11), and the size of
the dollar bloc’s monetary policy shock is 0.7 times the U.S. monetary shock,
i.e. ε∗t = 0.7εt. I refer to this case as the soft dollar peg. As in the baseline
simulations, to evaluate the value of the dollar peg, I contrast the flexible
exchange rate case in which the central bank of the dollar bloc follows the
Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing, with an alternative with the soft
dollar peg.
Figure 4 (on page 39) and row 5 of Table 4 shows the effects of a U.S.
interest rate shock in the case of the soft dollar peg. The dollar bloc must
now mimic U.S. monetary policy. Figure 4(h) shows that an interest rate in
the dollar bloc is decreased by 70 basis points. The dollar depreciates because
the U.S. interest rate is temporarily low relative to the dollar bloc’s interest
rates. Therefore, the soft dollar peg does not eliminating the expenditure
switching effect. Consequently, U.S. output increases more than the dollar
bloc’s output. In this model, the ratio of the output effect in the dollar bloc
to the output effect in the U.S. is 0.71. The IMF (2013) found that the ratio
of the peak output effect of a U.S. monetary policy shock in countries with
a dollar peg to the peak output effect of a U.S. monetary policy shock in the
U.S. is 0.75. So the model with the soft dollar peg can in essence match the
empirically observed ratio.
Table 4 shows that the value of the soft dollar peg is positive (negative)
for the dollar bloc (the U.S.) but smaller than in the baseline case of the
dollar peg. The changes in the value of the dollar peg are caused by the
behavior of the terms of trade. Figure 3(f) shows that under the soft dollar
peg, unlike under the dollar peg, the U.S. terms of trade improve. However,
the value of the soft dollar peg is negative (positive) for the U.S. (the dollar
bloc) because the soft dollar peg limits the ability of the U.S. to improve its
terms of trade at the dollar bloc’s expense.
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Finally, I change parameter values, holding everything else the same as
in the baseline simulations. Row 6 shows the value of the dollar peg when
the price rigidity parameter (γ) is reduced from 0.75 to 0.5. This implies the
average duration of prices is reduced from four quarters to two. The values
of the dollar peg move closer to zero because the real effects of monetary
policy are smaller in the case of greater price flexibility.
Row 7 shows the value of the dollar peg in a case where the within-
country substitutability (θ) increased from 6 to 9. For instance, Gali’s (2015)
textbook uses this value. The within-country substitutability affects only
the initial steady state and thus welfare results, but not the response of
endogenous variables. According to Equation (25), the lower the within-
country substitutability is, the lower the initial levels of employment, output
and consumption are. Therefore, the lower within-country substitutability
is, the more an increase in employment and consumption of a given size
increases welfare. Table 4 shows that the value of the dollar peg for the
dollar bloc drops to 0.34. The value of the dollar peg for the U.S. drops so
little that due to rounding it is still roughly -0.13.
In row 8, the Frisch elasticity is reduced from 1 to 0.5, while in row 9 it
is increased to 2. I find small quantitative changes in the value of the dollar
peg.
After the Great Recession, the relative size of China’s economy has in-
creased. In row 10, the relative of the U.S. is reduced from 0.6 to 0.55,
holding the import-to-GDP ratios constant. The values of the dollar peg are
robust to changes in the relative size of the U.S. economy.
4.4 Discussion
The positive value of the dollar peg for emerging economies provides a ratio-
nale for fixing their currencies to the dollar during a period of expansionary
U.S. monetary policy. The model is linear, so the effects of contractionary
U.S. monetary policy would be the opposite. The negative value of the dollar
peg during contractionary U.S. monetary policy implies that the dollar bloc
policy makers should choose differently to U.S. interest rate increases. In
this case, the dollar bloc should be more willing to let their currencies float
in order to avoid the appreciation of the dollar bloc’s currencies in line with
the dollar.
Figure 1 (on page 36) shows the yuan to one U.S. dollar exchange rate
and U.S. interest rates. Mertens and Shultz (2017) argue—based on IMF’s
reports on exchange arrangements—that, while China has closely monitored
the yuan’s movements against the dollar, it has not always followed a tight
dollar peg. China allowed mild fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate
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from 2006 to 2008 when China’s exchange rate policy was classified as a
crawling peg to the U.S. dollar.9 Figure 1 shows that the Fed increased
the interest rate in 2006. Moreover, from 2006 to 2008, the deviation from
the Taylor rule implies that U.S. monetary policy was contractionary. In
2007, the Fed began to cut the interest rate and by the beginning of 2008
it was below the interest rate implied by the Taylor rule, implying that U.S.
monetary policy become expansionary. Figure 1 shows that China returned
to the tight dollar peg in mid-2008 and Mertens and Shultz (2017) emphasize
that between 2008 and 2010, the yuan was stabilized relative to the U.S.
dollar, based on IMF’s classification of exchange rate arrangements.
Mertens and Shultz (2017) write that from 2011 to 2015 China’s exchange
rate policy was a crawl-like arrangement relative to the U.S. dollar, allowing
for wider fluctuations in the exchange rate. Figure 1 shows that by the end of
2010, the deviation of the actual interest rate from the Taylor rule was very
small. After the interest rate increase of the Fed in 2015, China has allowed
even wider fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate. Mertens and Shultz
(2017) highlight that in 2015, the central bank of China said that its exchange
rate policy is based on an exchange rate index of 13 currencies. Following
this, in 2016, the IMF changed China’s classification to an arrangement where
the exchange rate flexibility is limited relative to a group of currencies. This
allows for wider fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate. China’s exchange
rate policy supports some support the view that while the tight dollar peg
may not be optimal all the time—especially when the Fed raises interest rates—
it could be optimal when the Fed cuts interest rates aggressively and U.S.
monetary policy is looser than the Taylor rule implies.
The theme of this paper is related to a classic question of whether pegging
a country’s exchange rate is beneficial. Friedman (1953) finds that shocks
require the adjustment of relative price levels between countries and that
because internal prices are highly inflexible, the exchange rate should be
flexible. Feldstein (1992) argues that domestic deflation is likely to require a
period of increased unemployment, so a decline in the nominal exchange rate
would prove beneficial. Devereux and Engel (2003, 766) argue that "[t]his
reasoning has led to the well-known traditional recommendation to monetary
policy makers in open economies: an optimal monetary policy in an open
economy requires exchange-rate flexibility." Lahiri et al. (2008), however,
say that the classical finding in the world of sticky prices and perfect capital
9It is likely that the gradual appreciation of the yuan was related to the threat of
a tariff of 27.5%, which was the precise midpoint of a range of estimates of the yuan’s
undervaluation at that time, on all Chinese imports put forward by two U.S. senators in
2005. The yuan, however, appreciated by the required amount to neutralize the threat
(Economist 2009).
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mobility is that a flexible (fixed) exchange rate is optimal if shocks are mainly
real (monetary). The optimal exchange rate regime depends therefore on the
type of disturbance.
The recent literature has shown that the choice depends also on the cur-
rency of export pricing. Devereux and Engel (2003) found that a fixed (float-
ing) exchange rate regime is desirable under local (producer) currency pric-
ing for a small economy in the presence of country-specific real shocks in
cases where the cross-country substitutability is one. The most directly re-
lated work to this paper is Goldberg and Tille (2009). They developed a
three-country model (the U.S. and the dollar bloc consisting Asia and Latin
America) and analyzed the choice of the exchange rate regime in the face of
productivity shocks in cases where the cross-country substitutability is one.
They found that the dollar bloc remains better off under flexible exchange
rates than under a unilateral peg.
The recent literature, however, has not addressed the question of whether
a fixed exchange rate is optimal for the foreign country in cases of domestic
monetary shocks. The results of this paper show that the optimal choice of
exchange rate regime in the face of monetary shocks is predicated by cross-
country substitutability. It is optimal for emerging economies to fix their
exchange rates in cases of U.S. monetary expansion, unless cross-country
substitutability is very low. A limitation of the paper is that no other types
of shocks are modelled. So one should remember that the optimal choice of
exchange rate regime depends on the importance of foreign monetary shocks
and the other types of shocks.
The existing literature describes various motivations for exchange rate
pegs in emerging economies. However, Mishkin (1998) argues that costs ex-
ceed benefits, such as providing an anchor for monetary policy. These costs
include the loss of an independent monetary policy, exposure to the transmis-
sion of the anchor country’s shocks, the increased likelihood of speculative
attacks and weakened accountability in pursuing anti-inflationary policies.
The biggest problem is that an exchange rate peg can increase financial in-
stability and heighten the potential for financial crises. Frankel (1999), on
the other hand, argues that the optimal exchange rate regime varies depend-
ing on the specific circumstances of the country and the circumstances of the
time period in question.
During the global financial crisis, the effects of aggressive U.S. monetary
policy on macroeconomic and financial stability in the dollar bloc have drawn
attention. Rajan (2011) and Wolf (2008) argue that U.S. monetary policy
leads to an overheating of the dollar bloc and rising inflation. Rajan (2011,
107) argues that these lead to "very real problems". On the other hand,
McKinnon and Schnabl (2012) and Schnabl (2010) analyze the costs and
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benefits of the dollar peg for China, East Asia and the rest of the World and
argue that the dollar peg plays a crucial role in the pursuit of macroeconomic
stability. This model supports the view of Rajan (2011) and Wolf (2008)
that exposure to U.S. monetary policy may lead to an overheating of the
dollar bloc: in the model, the dollar bloc’s output increases substantially, in
comparison to the flexible exchange rate case (recall Figure 3(b)). However,
the dollar peg is optimal, from the welfare point of view.
Figure 3(j) shows that under the dollar peg, expansionary U.S. monetary
policy leads to rising inflation in the dollar bloc. This result is consistent with
that of Erceg et al. (2011), who find that the response of core inflation in the
dollar bloc depends qualitatively on whether the dollar bloc pegs the cur-
rency or adheres to the Taylor rule. Thus, Rajan’s (2011) and Wolf’s (2008)
arguments that expansionary U.S. monetary policy may be too aggressive
for the dollar bloc, thereby creating inflation, seems justified.
The model, however, does not support the view that an overheating of the
dollar bloc and inflation would lead to real problems: the boom is followed
by a slightly negative output gap in the medium term because short term
inflation has reduced the real wage below its steady state value. A well-
known property of standard dynamic general equilibrium models, however,
is that they cannot generate boom-bust cycles or financial instability. Bordo
and Meissner (2012) find that the two key determinants of credit booms are
economic expansion and low interest rates, and credit booms heighten the
probability of a financial crisis. The dollar peg may force monetary expansion
in the dollar bloc in the expansionary phase of the business cycle, which may
be too aggressive for it. A limitation of the paper is that the dollar peg may
create financial instability that the present model cannot capture.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I analyze the consequences of the dollar peg during expan-
sionary U.S. monetary policy. The dollar peg has important implications
both for the U.S. and the dollar bloc. A key finding is that the value of the
dollar peg is typically positive for the dollar bloc, since it prevents the U.S.
improving its terms of trade at the expense of the dollar bloc. This provides
a rationale for fixing the exchange rate to the dollar during a period of ex-
pansionary U.S. monetary policy. So China’s return to the tight dollar peg
in 2008, when U.S. monetary policy deviated from the Taylor rule, may have
been a reaction to a beggar-thy-neighbor policy of the Fed. The dollar peg,
however, may lead to an overheating of the economy and rising inflation in
the dollar bloc.
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The value of the dollar peg is negative for the U.S., unless the cross-
country substitutability is very low. This provides a rationale for the U.S.
criticizing the dollar bloc’s exchange rate policy. However, dollar pegs in
emerging economies—including China—only reduce the welfare gain of expan-
sionary U.S. monetary policy to the U.S. The model therefore seems to ex-
plain quite well the behavior of China and the U.S.: China returned to a
tight dollar peg during the U.S. financial crisis, when the Fed cut interest
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Figure 2: Dynamic effects of a U.S. monetary shock under flexible exchange
rates
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Figure 3: Dynamic effects of a U.S. monetary shock under the dollar peg
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Figure 4: Dynamic effects of a U.S. monetary shock under the soft dollar peg
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